Anonymous Submission, The Australian National University
As is enshrined in the United Nations Charter, all peoples have a right to self-determination.[1] The ability of a people to determine their own political status is a central function of democracy; whilst imperfect, democracy exists when government serves the majority of the people to whom it is accountable. Crimea’s accession to Russia in 2014 represents majoritarian democracy because it accorded with majority wishes, clearly demonstrated both by the 16th March referendum and subsequent polling data. After examining Crimea’s historical context and demographic make-up, I explore the peninsula’s profound disinclination to remain in Ukraine, stemming from valid opposition to Kyiv’s alienating nation-building, economic, and geopolitical decisions. I demonstrate how these existing concerns were magnified by Euromaidan’s revolutionary bloodshed and instability, the operative cause for Crimea’s overwhelming support for accession. Widespread denunciation of the change has centred around opposition to Russian intervention, procedural illegality and unfairness, and a dearth of minority representation. I contend that these concerns attack the form rather than function of the sovereignty shift because, whilst the process was illegal and majoritarianism has its flaws, the substance was the exercise of democratic self-determination by popular majority.
This essay equates democracy with strict majoritarianism; democracy is most simply defined as the ability of the majority of a population to inform government policy. Accordingly, Crimea’s sovereignty shift can only be described as pure, democratic justice, in keeping with the principle of self-determination. In the Crimea-wide referendum, voters were asked whether they supported the reunification of Crimea with Russia or the restoration of the 1992 Constitution and the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine.[2] The response was near unanimous support for accession to Russia; with a participation rate of 83.1%, 96.77% voted in favour of the shift,[3]with similar numbers in Sevastopol.[4] In accordance with this democratic mandate, Crimea and Sevastopol’s legislative authorities jointly announced their independence from Ukraine and intention to become Russian federal subjects. The findings of American scholars in December 2014 corroborated referendum results;[5]following the transferral of sovereignty, with the inhabitants of Crimea offered citizenship of Russia or the option of maintaining their Ukrainian status, 98.1% of those self-identifying as culturally Russian and 91% of those identifying as Ukrainian had accepted Russian citizenship.[6] Additionally, they found high public trust in Vladimir Putin; 93.3% of cultural Russians and 83.4% of cultural Ukrainians supported the Russian President.[7] Compared with October 2014 census data, showing 67.9% of the Crimean population identifying as Russian and 15.7% as Ukrainian,[8] these findings underline obvious pro-accession sentiment across the two most numerous groupings. These and other independent results thus emphasise the fundamentally majoritarian, democratic nature of the sovereignty transfer from Ukraine to Russia.
Crimea’s complex history and cultural fault-lines serve as the beginning of an explanation for overwhelming support for accession to Russia. Since its incorporation into the Russian Empire in 1783,[9]control over Crimea has switched between Russia and Ukraine. Russian influence over the region was extensive and enduring, whereas Ukraine’s ties, established with the 1954 handover, were purely administrative,[10]with Crimea consequently having strong politico-cultural relations with Moscow. The USSR dissolved with Crimea remaining under Ukraine despite weak ‘Ukrainian’ sentiment; in the December 1991 Ukrainian independence referendum, Crimea voted only 54.19% in favour – the lowest nation-wide.[11] Comparatively, Crimea had voted 93.3% in favour of restoring autonomy within the USSR rather than in Ukraine in a peninsula-wide referendum in January, preceding the USSR’s dissolution.[12] History thus accounts for Crimea’s baseline ambivalence towards a ‘Ukrainian’ national identity and comparatively strong cultural affinity with Russia.
Additionally, post-Soviet Crimea had underlying ethno-cultural divisions which, whilst not inherently threatening to Ukrainian territorial integrity, were accidentally escalated. The peninsula was predominantly populated by a Russian-identifying cultural group which felt its culture threatened by Ukrainian dominance at the national level,[13] even though Russian was the dominant day-to-day language in Crimea. Comparatively, cultural Ukrainians and the indigenous Crimean Tatar minority had strong cultural identities distinct from the dominant Russian cultural group. Importantly, each group was wary of a loss of cultural distinctiveness. Such fault-lines called for considered national policies that granted concessions to all sides to avoid confrontation, but the relative tranquillity between the different ethnic groups was compromised by Kyiv’s decisions which politicised identity and catalysed cultural distinctiveness into opposition to the central government.
Therefore, the demographic, historical, and cultural situation in Crimea provided a basis for the growth of anti-Kyiv and pro-Moscow sentiment, although this development was not a given. The catalyst for overwhelming Crimean support for accession to Russia can be explained by the cavalier nation-building policies of Ukrainisation, poor economic management, and unpopular geopolitical positions pursued by Kyiv which antagonised the culturally Russian majority. Ukrainisation policies, aimed at reducing Russian linguistic influence and creating a separate Ukrainian identity, commenced under President Kravchuk and continued under Kuchma, with Ukrainian declared the sole official language and pressure placed on Russian-medium schools across the country to close.[14] Yushchenko also promoted Ukrainisation, obliging all television programmes to broadcast solely in Ukrainian. Russian occupied a highly precarious position until the 2012 Languages Law, under which Russian was recognised as a regional language of minorities.[15] Such cultural policies were widely perceived as a Kyivan and western Ukrainian attack on the established, majority culture in Crimea and led to cultural identity politicisation.
Furthermore, a rift grew between Crimea and Kyiv due to the region’s poor economic performance. Whilst the peninsula had the potential for dynamic economic growth due to its trade and tourism-friendly geographical position, developed infrastructure, physical security, plentiful agricultural land, and cultural attractions, its performance left much to be desired. Crimea’s tourism industry particularly lagged behind its Georgian and Russian competitors, dependent on poor-quality, Soviet-era resorts.[16] Although allocation of state funds for Crimea increased following Yanukovych’s 2010 victory,[17]the fundamental hindrances to economic growth remained unchanged. Widespread regional corruption, in the form of vested interests’ control of access to natural resources and business assets, was permitted by a central government itself held perpetually in thrall to oligarchs,[18]reducing competition and discouraging foreign investment. Russian investment in particular – an easy potential income source – was opposed by Kyiv for political reasons and numerous high-profile deals were rejected by the central government. For example, a $3.4 billion proposal of then-Mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, to construct an extensive youth holiday camp in Crimea was scuttled to widespread regional frustration with Kyiv’s economic management.[19]
An additional cause of overwhelming Crimean opposition to Kyiv was the central government’s often antagonising international stances. A geopolitical clash existed between democratic-nationalist Ukrainian governments, hoping to distance Ukraine from its Russian past via moves towards NATO and the EU, and a majority in the peninsula which regarded Moscow as their political and civilisational locus.[20] Such an oppositional centre-periphery dynamic can be witnessed in the Crimean protests against Ukraine’s potential entry into NATO from May to June 2006, with thousands of demonstrators blocking the transport of American cargo supplies in the port of Feodosia.[21] The response to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War likewise betrays conflicting geopolitical stances between Kyiv and Simferopol. On the one hand, Yushchenko publicly considered raising prices for the Sevastopol naval base rented to Russia,[22]and Kyiv even stated it had the right to bar Russian ships despatched to Georgia from returning to Crimea.[23] On the other hand, Crimea’s Supreme Council appealed to the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s legislature, to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in support of Russian intervention and in opposition to Georgian sovereignty claims.[24] That this move was spearheaded by a local, Russophilic NGO – the Russian Community of Crimea –[25] underlines the vastly divergent geopolitical outlooks of Kyiv and Simferopol. An existing lack of cultural commonality between Kyiv and Crimea was therefore combined with the Russian majority’s legitimate dissatisfaction with the central government’s nation-building, economic, and geopolitical policies to create significant discontent in Crimea. This alone, however, was not sufficient to result in the overwhelming support for accession to Russia witnessed on 16th March 2014.
The operative cause pushing Crimea from a dissatisfied region to a hotbed of secession were the Euromaidan protests from November 2013 to February 2014 and the anger they provoked amongst Crimea’s Russian majority. Secessionist tendencies had previously been viewed as inherently dangerous to interethnic peninsular relations;[26]even strong pro-Russians supported the ‘bad peace’ the status quo afforded to maintain their culture in fear that secessionist steps would lead to harsh reprisals from Kyiv. It was only with Euromaidan that the focus of pro-Russian groups became accession to Russia, perceived as the most practicable way to protect their culture. Whilst the peninsula was not particularly enamoured of Yanukovych himself, the Russian majority was infuriated and galvanised by the casualties of berkut special forces in the Euromaidan clashes – 150 of whom were Crimean.[27] Anger manifested in anti-Euromaidan protests in Simferopol and Yalta from the 19th to the 26th February,[28]where the popular Slav Antifascist Front crashed with pro-Euromaidan activists.[29] Furthermore, returning berkut troops were accorded heroes’ welcomes on 22nd February, and an Army Day celebration on 23rd evolved into a 25,000-strong pro-Russian rally demanding a referendum on Crimean independence and appealing to Russia for protection. In addition to public rage, the deaths of so many Crimean serviceman in Kyiv and the chaos threatening the president affirmed the fear that if the state was unable to protect its capital, it could not be relied upon to defend Crimea. In response, the Russian Community of Crimea and Russian Unity NGOs established citizens’ ‘self-defence units’ in Crimea.[30] Therefore, whilst a lack of ‘Ukrainianness’, Russian cultural dominance, and majority opposition to Ukraine’s cultural, economic, and geopolitical policies laid the groundwork for secession, it was Euromaidan and Kyiv’s impotence in maintaining order that catalysed the outpouring of democratic support for independence from Ukraine and accession to Russia reflected by the referendum a week later.
Crimea’s accession to Russia was clearly an example of democratic justice, as the majority’s opposition to autonomy within Ukraine was demonstrated by the referendum and promptly legislated by Crimea’s government. However, numerous criticisms exist of the process under which sovereignty was transferred, the first being Russian use of force. Article 2 of the UN Charter stipulates that members “refrain… from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”,[31]making the 27th February entrance and occupation of Crimean government buildings by Russian special forces deserving of opprobrium.
A second criticism relates to procedural illegality and unfairness. The referendum was unconstitutional according to Article 73 of Ukraine’s 1996 Constitution,[32]stipulating that all territorial changes be confirmed by a nation-wide referendum. Furthermore, the legislative process was opaque as Russian forces held the Crimean parliament hostage[33]and the referendum itself was marred by malpractice, with some instances of voting by non-Crimean Russian citizens.[34]
A lack of representation of the minority Crimean Tatars is a third criticism. Whilst the Tatars had been the most vehemently anti-Russian group in Crimea, owing to historic oppression and 1994 deportation to Uzbekistan,[35]this group makes up only around 9% of Crimea’s population.[36] Their voice was marginalised during the proceedings and numerous Tatar families fled Crimea due to security concerns preceding the vote,[37] diminishing the referendum’s ability to encapsulate Crimea’s diversity of opinion. However, democracy is an imperfect system and minority representation a common concern, especially when liberal constitutional provisions to protect and amplify minority voices are non-existent. Although Tatar voices’ lack of inclusion in the process reduces the overall democratic nature of the referendum, it does not meaningfully dispute support for accession as the majority’s opinion in Crimea. Whilst raising legitimate concerns about the legality and fairness of the process, the above criticisms do not detract significantly from the nature or substance of the change in Crimea’s status. Russia’s contravention of international law, irregular parliamentary and voting practices, and the exclusion of minority views deserve criticism and highlight the ease with which democratic processes can be weakened, but neither invalidate the unanimous voice of almost 97% of voters nor condemn the struggle for self-determination.
The transfer of sovereignty over Crimea from Ukraine to Russia is, at its core, a manifestation of pure, democratic justice. In the March referendum, the Russian majority, long dominant in Crimea, rejected continued existence within Ukraine as untenable. This was predominantly the fault of Kyiv’s antagonising nation-building, economic, and geopolitical policy missteps and the central government’s inability to maintain law and order in the capital during Euromaidan and the 2014 Revolution, much less protect the rights of a faraway autonomous republic. The following affirmation by Crimea’s governing institutions of the region’s independence and desire to accede to Russia reflected a fundamental principle of democracy – that government should serve the wishes of the majority. Opposing voices have argued that the administration of a fair vote was impossible, with Russian intervention a violation of international law, procedural discrepancies raising serious questions about the acceptability of the referendum and associated legislation, and the marginalisation of minority voices leading to a case of ‘tyranny of the majority’. These arguments, whilst raising valid concerns about the process and implementation of Crimean accession, attack the format rather than the underlying function of the sovereignty shift: the establishment of Crimea’s right to choose its own path of political development, in recognition of the desire of the majority of the peninsula’s inhabitants for self-determination.
Footnotes
[1] “United Nations Charter (full text),” United Nations, accessed November 8, 2019, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/.
[2] John O’Loughlin and Gerard Toal, “The Crimea conundrum: legitimacy and public opinion after annexation,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 60, no. 1 (March 2019): 6.
[3] Ibid., 6-7.
[4] Oliver Laughland, Conal Urquhart and Alan Yuhas, “Crimea referendum: early results indicate ‘landslide’ for secession – as it happened,” Guardian, March 17, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/16/crimea-referendum-polls-open-live.
[5] O’Loughlin and Toal, “The Crimea conundrum,” 13.
[6] Ibid., 18.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Itogi Perepisi Naseleniya C Krymskom Federal’nom Okruge (Results of the Population Census in the Crimean Federal District) (Moscow: Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoy Statistiki [Federal Service of State Statistics], 2015), 112, https://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/perepis_krim/KRUM_2015.pdf.
[9] Maria Matveeva, Through Times of Trouble: Conflict in Southeastern Ukraine Explained from Within (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017), 47.
[10] Ibid., 48-49.
[11] Ibid., 49.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid., 48.
[14] Ibid., 53.
[15] Steven Pifer and Hannah Thoburn, “What Ukraine’s New Language Law Means For National Unity,” Brookings, August 21, 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2012/08/21/what-ukraines-new-language-law-means-for-national-unity/.
[16] Matveeva, Through Times, 54.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Victor Andrusiv et al., The Future of the Ukrainian Oligarchs (Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute for the Future, 2018), 5.
[19] Matveeva, Through Times, 54.
[20] Ibid., 56.
[21] Nick Paton Walsh, “Protests threaten NATO war games,” Guardian, June 12, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jun/12/ukraine.russia.
[22] Andrew E. Kramer, “NATO Ships in Black Sea Raise Alarms in Russia,” New York Times, August 27, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/world/europe/28russia.html.
[23] Stephen F. Larrabee, “Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics,” Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 41.
[24] “Recognise Georgian regions, says Ukraine’s Crimea,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 17, 2008, https://www.rferl.org/a/Recognize_Georgian_Regions_Says_Crimea/1200758.html.
[25] Matveeva, Through Times, 56.
[26] O’Loughlin and Toal, “The Crimea conundrum,” 9.
[27] Matveeva, Through Times, 59.
[28] Michael Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 15.
[29] Matveeva, Through Times, 59-60.
[30] Manu Brabo, “Crimea’s self-defence force,” Al Jazeera, April 10, 2014, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2014/04/pictures-crimea-self-defence-forc-2014471556562314.html.
[31] “United Nations Charter (full text),” United Nations.
[32] John B. Bellinger III and Johnathan Masters, “Why the Crimean Referendum is Illegitimate,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 16, 2014, https://www.cfr.org/interview/why-crimean-referendum-illegitimate.
[33] O’Loughlin and Toal, “The Crimea conundrum,” 23.
[34] “Declaring victory, Crimean and Russian officials pledge fast integration,” Kyiv Post, March 17, 2014, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/voting-in-crimean-referendum-starts-even-as-ukraine-government-declares-it-illegitimate-339523.html.
[35] O’Loughlin and Toal, “The Crimea conundrum,” 17.
[36] Ibid., 14.
[37] Oksana Grytsenko and Anastasia Vlasova, “Crimean Tatars face tough choice: dig in, or flee,” Kyiv Post, March 11, 2014, https://www.kyivpost.com/multimedia/photo/tatar-self-defense-339029.
The Global Security Initiative 